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AT THE CROSSROADS OF
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
Introduction by
Alan Heinrich,* Karl Manheim,** & David J. Steele***
It has been 130 years since Harvard Law School Dean Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell transformed American legal education with
his case book method of instruction. According to Dean Langdell,
Law, considered as a science,... has arrived at its present
state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, ex-
tending in many cases through centuries. This growth is to
be traced in the main through a series of cases; and much
the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the
doctrine effectively is by studying the cases in which it is
embodied.
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, American law schools
still mostly follow Langdell. Every lawyer and judge in America has
been schooled in this manner. We learn law by studying what has
gone before. Change occurs incrementally, "by slow degrees."
To a large extent this is good. Law serves as a calming force,
mediating the impacts of political, social, and scientific change. One
need only recall the persistence and continuity of legal doctrines after
the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the industrial revolu-
tion. Law is our connection to the past, not out of any nostalgic ro-
manticism, but to provide the certainty and predictability our social
and economic institutions require.
* Loyola Law School, J.D. candidate May 2000; At the Crossroads of
Law and Technology student participant
** Professor, Loyola Law School. Professor Manheim was the Loyola
faculty advisor for the Symposium.
*** Loyola Law School, J.D. candidate May 2000; At the Crossroads of
Law and Technology Coordinator. We wish to thank the project's participants
for helping make the event a success. We especially thank Dr. Yuen, whose
vision and dedication made this Symposium a reality.
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But the old ways of doing, teaching, and thinking about law are
fundamentally obsolete. Nary a legal doctrine or jurisprudence will
survive intact the present ferment. The information revolution un-
derway will change law as nothing in our experience or understand-
ing has. It took a millennium to develop a sophisticated common
law regime, one based on rights, property, and regulation. It may
take less than a decade for that regime to unravel, as core concepts
lose meaning. Not surprisingly, we are unprepared.
The relationship between law and technology is traditionally
symbiotic. Scientific and industrial advances lead to new legal
norms and requirements, which in turn assert their own influence on
technology. Regulators know this phenomenon as "technology
forcing," where government agencies set technical standards (in ar-
eas such as safety and environmental protection) that cannot be met
with current technology. By phasing in higher standards, an agency
induces technological improvement.
The flip side of technology forcing is now being felt in the legal
profession and academy. "Law-forcing" occurs where technological
change is so dramatic as to cause doctrinal reform. The advent of the
Internet has already pressed many existing rules to the breaking
point; more are surely to follow. Along the way, it has done nothing
less than remake the global economy. There are not many historical
parallels. Perhaps the invention of the printing press, which
spawned, inter alia, both government regulation of speech and its
corollary, the right of speech, is the closest example.
Everything about law is likely to be rethought in the coming
years. How it is taught, practiced, adjudicated-even its relevance-
are subject to reexamination. In the following section we briefly ex-
plore some of the transformations taking place before our eyes, to
which law must either adjust or withdraw.
1. An example of this is the automobile airbag. In 1966, the Department
of Transportation began to develop standards for "passive occupant restraint
systems" despite industry resistance and the lack of current technology. The
inflatable airbag emerged several years later and has become standard equip-
ment in nearly all new vehicles sold in the United States. See Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983) ("The
Act intended that safety standards not depend on current technology and could
be 'technology-forcing' in the sense of inducing the development of superior
safety design.").
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I. LAW-FORCING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF RULES
AND RELATIONSHIPS
Law will evolve in this technological age, as it has in past ones,
to adapt to new forms of human interaction. How smoothly the tran-
sition occurs will depend on the pace of change and the flexibility of
our legal institutions, including legal education.
A. New Forms of Property
What new forms of property will be created, can they be pro-
tected by legal systems, or will self-help become the dominant para-
digm?2 Some maintain that "property in cyberspace" is no different
than other forms of intellectual property and fits comfortably under
existing doctrine.3 Still, there is no denying that new forms of prop-
erty are emerging, accompanied by their own mini-legal systems.
The controversy over domain names and registration systems has
spawned its own legislation,4 governing bodies, 5 and dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms.6
2. Self-help in a technology context could include a variety of mathemati-
cal, physical, and design features that limit or expand control over use, altera-
tion, and distribution. Encryption and the V-chip are common examples. In-
deed, information itself can be structured to include self-help mechanisms,
such as in computer code. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). See also David R. Johnson, Let's Let
the Net Self-Regulate (visited Mar. 15, 2000) <http://www.cli.org/selford/
Index.htn>.
3. See Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (arguing that general principles can be applied to
specialized endeavors such as the internet). For contrasting views, see Law-
rence Lessig, The Law Of The Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv.
L. REV. 501 (1999); Gregory E. Perry & Cherie Ballard, A Chip by any Other
Name Would Still Be a Potato: The Failure of Law and Its Definitions to Keep
Pace with Computer Technology, 24 TEx. TECH L. REV. 797, 800 (1993) (ar-
guing that the law often "places too much reliance upon the past" and is thus
"caught unaware" by many technological advances).
4. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)).
5. See generally The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) (visited Mar. 12, 2000) <http://www.icann.org/>.
6. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (visited
Mar. 12,2000) <http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm>.
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New property is also being created by research into the human
genome. Can the genetic blueprint of DNA molecules be reduced to
ownership? As pure information, it may not be patentable.7 Nor is
the knowledge base subject to copyright (not authored) or trademark
(not created). Yet, without some form of protection, private research
might easily be discouraged.
The "Law of the Genome" has not been developed yet, but will
be, just as property rights in tissue and organs are being developed
through legislation and litigation.' Concurrent research by the pub-
licly funded National Human Genome Research Institute9 and by the
privately owned Celera Genomics,' 0 has, until now, generated coop-
eration and competition. But, private versus public ownership of ge-
netic information is suddenly a large and divisive issue as the genetic
map nears completion." Whether Celera can exclude others (the
7. The high-tech field of bioinformatics has generated many patents.
However, such "biotechnology patents tend to suffer from enablement prob-
lems, i.e., the patent specification really doesn't allow an independent party to
recreate the processes described in the patent." Bad Patents, Legal Resources
and Tools for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the Internet, Bio-
informatics, and Electronic Commerce (last visited Mar. 15, 2000)
<http://www.bustpatents.com/>. The growing dispute over the patentability of
information methods is an example of the difficulty law has in keeping pace
with scientific and technological advances. See James Gleick, Patently Ab-
surd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44.
8. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal.3d 120, 793 P.2d
479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990) (rejecting patient's claim of property right to
tissue samples used to derive patented cell line and pharmaceuticals, but up-
holding claims based on fiduciary duty). Related statutory law is fairly exten-
sive, typically dealing with organ donation and other biological materials. See
id. at 137, 793 P.2d at 489, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
9. The NHGRI is part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). See The
National Human Genome Research Institute (visited Mar. 15, 2000)
<http://www.nhgri.nih.gov>.
10. Celera is a unit of The Perkin-Elmer Corporation.
11. As this Article was going to press, a battle was erupting over access to
genomic information. On March 14, 2000, President Clinton and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair stated that the sequence of the human genome should be
made freely available to all researchers. Indeed, the International Human Ge-
nome Sequencing Consortium has adopted a policy that all human genome se-
quence data should be placed in publicly accessible databases. See National
Human Genome Research Institute, International Human Genome Sequencing
Consortium Backs Rapid Construction of a Working Draft and Stands Firm on
Public Access (visited Mar. 15, 2000) <http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/NEWS/
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hallmark of property ownership) from its genetic research is not sim-
ply a matter of intellectual property law. It requires a national dia-
logue on public health and public policy where the policymakers are
well informed. The legal advisors will need to understand molecular
biology; the genetic engineers will need to understand law.
While new property is emerging, old property is being chal-
lenged. The intense debate over software development illustrates the
point. At the center of traditional business norms is the trade se-
cret--the ability to prevent others from exploiting product and de-
sign information. Companies not only patent and copyright their
creations, but closely guard it from competitors. Secret ("closed
source") code is traditional, safe, and insular. For mainstream soft-
ware companies like Microsoft, it creates enormous wealth. But se-
crecy can cause products to be unfriendly and static, complicating
compatibility with other software and stifling innovation.
Open source code describes products developed in the open and
by collaboration. By facilitating cooperation with other products and
developers, open code leads to greater flexibility and adaptability.
Open code is a different kind of property, if property at all. Linux,
for example, is an alternative to Microsoft's Windows operating
systems. Because it is freely available, it is not property in the tradi-
tional sense, nor does it produce wealth on its own accord. Only
through bundling with value-added products and services can Linux
command a price at retail. As Linux challenges Windows and gains
market share, old ways of thinking about property are similar-
ly challenged. The conflict between closed code and open code
hurman-sequencingdataaccess.html>. Accordingly, all sequence data pro-
duced by the international consortium is deposited every 24 hours in GenBank,
where it is freely available to any researcher with an Internet connection, with-
out restrictions on use.
In contrast, the leading private genome research company, Celera Corp.,
has said it would not "give away its proprietary information to its competitors."
See Paul Jacobs & Peter G. Gosselin, Firm Stands Fast on Retaining Genetic
Data, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at C3. Not surprisingly, investors tend to pre-
fer proprietary status for the decoded genome. After the Clinton-Blair an-
nouncement, rumors of unrestricted public access caused "frantic selling [of
stocks which] wiped away tens of billions of dollars in market value from the
industry." Alex Berenson & Nicholas Wade, A Call for Sharing of Research
Causes Gene Stocks to Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
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(emblematic of old and new property) was one of the themes of this
Symposium.
12
Old property is not only in competition with new property, its
continuing relevance may be threatened by emerging technologies.
For example, the Internet threatens to weaken the protection of copy-
right and other forms of intellectual property. As long as production
and distribution mechanisms were visible and regulable, intellectual
property rights could be enforced through legal remedies. With the
instant transmission and global distribution enabled by the Internet,
legal protections for intellectual property owners are inadequate.
This is demonstrated by the DeCSS DVD13 copy control case. Open
code programmers reverse engineered DVD copy control encryption
technology (known as Content Scrambling System, or "CSS") and
posted their new "DeCSS" code, which defeats DVD encryption, on
the Internet. The DVD Copy Control Association brought suit
against the programmers alleging violation of their trade secrets.
How effective will the injunction be, now that the decryption algo-
rithms have been distributed across the planet? Is it really possible to
characterize as a "trade secret" DVD encryption code that has been
posted on the Internet and available for the entire world to download
for free? Clearly, any such characterization is a legal fiction created
to serve other equitable interests.14 But will trade secrets persist as a
viable doctrine if it is reduced to the status of a legal fiction? 5
12. See Closed Corp. v. Open Sesame: A Simulated Infringement Case
Arising in Cyberspace, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1055 (2000).
13. DVD stands for "Digital Versatile Disc."
14. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804
(Cal. Super. Ct Santa Clara County Jan. 20, 2000) (order granting preliminary
injunction), available at <http://www.eff.org/ip/Video/DVDCCA.case/
20000120-pi-order.html> ("The Court is not persuaded that trade secret status
should be deemed destroyed at this stage merely by the posting of the trade se-
cret to the Internet... To hold otherwise would do nothing less than encour-
age misappropriaters of trade secrets to post the fruits of their wrongdoing on
the Internet as quickly as possible and as widely as possible thereby destroying
a trade secret forever. Such a holding would not be prudent in this age of the
Internet.").
15. Another example of this phenomenon is presented by the renegade pro-
gram "Napster," which facilitates the free (and often illegal) exchange of copy-
righted music on the Internet. See Napster, Inc. (visited Apr. 18, 2000)
<http://www.napster.com>. In an ironic twist, the Napster network has been
hijacked by hackers who are using it to exchange other types of software.
1040
ANTR ODUCTION
B. Rights in the Brave New World of Manufactured Life and Identity
New biological forms and relationships are emerging. This in-
cludes everything from genetically altered crops to cloned pigs, each
creating its own complex of legal and ethical questions, not the least
of which is whether life itself can be patented.' 6 Extension of these
technologies to human beings is likely not far off, raising profound
questions of genetic essentialism. Will cloned and quasi-persons
enjoy the same set of political and civil rights as "traditional hu-
mans"? Already our jurisprudence must deal with multiple biologi-
cal parenthood (e.g., birth and donor mothers).' 7 How will it respond
to new forms of personhood, whether they are biological, electrome-
chanical, or virtual?' 8 Can machines have legal personality?' 9 What
legal rights and obligations will artificial intelligence have?20
Identity itself will become harder to define. Is it to be found in
an individual's DNA structure or in the electronic record of her life's
activities. 2 1 If the latter, and perhaps the former, it can be appropri-
ated or manufactured.22 "Digital personas" are now commonplace.
"Napster officials say they are considering their options." P.J. Huffstutter &
Greg Miller, Hackers Find New Uses for Song-Swap Software, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2000, at Cl.
16. See generally Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellec-
tual Property, and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 267
(1995).
17. See Joan Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Con-
sequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 865, 866 n.4
(1985) ("It is already possible for a child to have five different 'parents': the
woman who donated the egg, the man who donated the sperm, the woman to
whose womb the fertilized embryo is transferred so she can carry it to birth,
and the man and woman who will receive and presumably raise the infant").
18. See, e.g., Charles Kester, Is There a Person in That Body?: An Argu-
ment for the Priority of Persons and the Need for a New Legal Paradigm, 82
GEo. L.J. 1643 (1994); Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Con-
stitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic
Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1425 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Leon Wein, The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: To-
ward an Automation Jurisprudence, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 103 (1992).
20. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood For Artificial In-
telligences, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1231 (1992).
21. See Hugh Miller, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 179 (1998).
22. The problem of identity theft has become so pervasive that Congress
has enacted a new felony statute to deal with the problem. See Identity Theft
and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3010 (1998)
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When it is as easy to swap genes as it is to invent e-mail names, rules
of identity and definition will become even more critical.
II. CHALLENGES TO LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
As substantive rights and doctrines are transformed by techno-
logical change, the political and legal institutions within which these
rights and doctrines have meaning will themselves be transformed.
Legislatures, courts, regulatory bodies, and law enforcement agen-
cies face substantial institutional challenges in the coming years.
The radical social implications of many recent technological de-
velopments would seem to invite wide-ranging legislative re-
sponses. At the same time, however, the rapid and dynamic pace
of change undermines the effectiveness of traditional legislative so-
lutions. Today's legislative bodies must confront the very real pos-
sibility that their responses to technologically driven challenges will
become obsolete upon their enactment.24 As a result, they must at-
tempt either to anticipate future technological change--a formidable
task--or to draft technology-neutral legislation (which could frus-
trate the purpose of the legislative response in the first place).
As legislative bodies struggle to identify their role in a society
being radically reshaped by technology, they may delegate more and
more of their rule-making authority to administrative agencies.
Agencies typically have greater flexibility and expertise than legis-
latures;25 their rule-making procedures are less cumbersome than
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) (Supp. IV 1998)).
23. Recent developments in Internet domain name registration prompted
the U.S. Congress to enact the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2000)).
24. For example, in 1992, Congress enacted the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
1001-1010 (2000)) which, inter alia, imposed a "royalty charge" on sales of
digital audio tape recorders and digital audio recording media (e.g. blank digi-
tal tape). Shortly thereafter, digital recordable disc machines and discs were
developed, undermining the effectiveness of the Act See Robert Starrett, CD-
Recording: Yesterday, Tomorrow, and Today, CD-ROM PROFESSIONAL, Nov.
1995, at 111 (describing the capabilities of CD recording technology).
25. See generally Harvey L. Pitt; Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE . ON REG. 149, 164 (1990) ("Ad-
ministrative agencies were established largely to develop and consolidate ex-
pertise in technical areas of societal interest.... [A]dministrative agencies fill
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traditional legislative processes, making it easier-and quicker-for
agencies to adopt temporary measures and change old rules that have
proven ineffective, unwise, or obsolete.26
In many cases, however, the best type of legislative response to
technology may well be a very limited and circumscribed response.
Reactionary or ill-considered laws may have the effect of frustrating
technological advancement. In his keynote address that concludes
this Symposium, Ira Magaziner, one of the chief architects of the
Clinton administration's Internet policy, discusses this danger and
advocates a wait-and-see approach to on-line regulation.2 7 Where
collective action is necessary, vr. Magaziner contends, the legisla-
ture may look to industry and other private sector stakeholder groups
for self-regulatory initiatives.2s Such was the case recently where the
U.S. government facilitated the private sector's regulation of the
Internet's domain name system 29 Similarly, in the area of privacy
protection, the federal government's main role has been to promote
the interstices of Congressional pronouncements, at a level far beyond that
which Congress is willing or able to provide.") (footnotes omitted).
26. See Cass Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE
L.J. 529, 551 (1997) ("For the most part, appropriate solutions to the problem
of statutory obsolescence should come from administrative agencies, immersed
in the problems at hand and having both technocratic and democratic virtues
One example of this kind of legislative response can be seen in the Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), one of the first pieces of fed-
eral legislation exclusively to regulate on-line activities. See Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat 2681-728 (1998) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6504 (2000)). COPPA requires operators of on-line
services to obtain verifiable parental consent prior to collecting personal in-
formation from children under the age of 13. See id. Congress charged the
FTC with approving specific mechanisms of obtaining verifiable parental con-
sent under the Act, "taking into consideration available technology." 15
U.S.C. § 6501(9). The Commission has adopted a temporary "sliding scale"
approach to parental consent, approving the use of unsecure e-mail consent in
some circumstances. See FTC Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64
Fed. Reg. 59,901-902 (1999) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 312). This sliding
scale approach expires in April 2002, when the Commission anticipates secure
e-mail services will be widely available. See id. at 59,888 to 59,901-902.
27. See Ira Magaziner, Keynote Address: At the Crossroads of Law and
Technology, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1165 (2000).
28. See id. at 1170-72.
29. See id.
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industry self-regulation.30 It remains to be seen, however, whether
industry self-regulation will adequately address the significant pri-
vacy concerns raised by certain on-line practices and technologies.3 '
Unlike legislatures, courts generally do not have the same op-
portunity to take a laissez-faire approach to emergent technologies
and the social and legal dilemmas they may create. Courts must de-
cide the cases that are presented to them. And yet they must decide
these cases on the basis of legal doctrines created many years ago
that may no longer adequately address current realities and chal-
lenges.
From an institutional perspective, the present judicial decision-
making process may no longer adequately meet the demands of the
times. The laborious, sometimes glacial, pace of litigation would
seem to be ill suited to a society marked by rapid technological
change. For example, one commentator has observed that the slow-
ness of the appellate process is particularly unsuited to cases involv-
ing rapidly changing technology, especially where some form of pro-
spective relief is sought.32 Increasingly, the appellate courts may be
faced with the prospect of reviewing factual findings that were sound
when first made by the trial court but no longer valid at the time of
appellate review. One solution to this challenge would be for the
appellate court to make its own factual finding. 4 This solution
would have profound effects on the traditional "division of labor"
within the judicial system.
30. See id.
31. According to a recent FTC report to Congress, industry self-regulation
in this area is exhibiting some encouraging progress, but is nevertheless pro-
ceeding very slowly. See Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Federal
Trade Commission Report to Congress (July 1999). Although the FTC stated
that federal privacy legislation "is not appropriate at this time," id. at 12, some
form of legislative action in the area of privacy protection is increasingly
likely. In fact, a recent report states that over eighty different on-line privacy
bills are pending at the federal or state level. See Kelly Heam, Wild Web
Hears Hoofeats of Lawmakers, CHIUSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 14, 2000, at
20.
32. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rap-
idly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEx. L. REv. 269 (1999).
33. See id.
34. See id.
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Arguably, judicial decision-making may be challenged at a more
radical level in coming years. Traditional rule-based, categorical
reasoning, one of the hallmarks of the judicial decision-making proc-
ess, is ill-suited to address areas of dynamic change. The Supreme
Court itself has recognized this fact. In Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,35 the Court consid-
ered a First Amendment challenge to three provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. In
light of the dynamic pace of change within the cable industry and the
communications field generally, the Court eschewed its traditional
First Amendment analysis.36 In particular, the Court refused to as-
sign cable television a particular "forumd' category from its tradi-
tional First Amendment forum analysis and also declined to catego-
rize the standard of review it would apply to the law.37 Instead, the
Court reached its result through an ad hoc, fact intensive analysis. 38
Jurisprudence in an era of dynamic change may well proceed on an
increasingly case-by-case basis.
35. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
36. See id. at 742 ("[A]ware as we are of the changes taking place in the
law, the technology, and the industrial structure related to communications...
we believe it unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one
specific set of words now."); cf id. at 776-77 (Souter, J., concurring). In his
concurrence, Justice Souter stated:
As cable and telephone companies begin their competition for control
over the single wire that will carry both their services, we can hardly
settle rules for review of regulation on the assumption that cable will
remain a separable and useful category of First Amendment scrutiny
... [. W]e have to accept the likelihood that the media of communi-
cations will become less categorical and more protean. Because we
cannot be confident that for purposes of judging speech restrictions it
will continue to make sense to distinguish cable from other technolo-
gies, and because we know that changes in these regulated technolo-
gies will enormously alter the structure of regulation itself, we should
be shy about saying the final word today about what will be accepted
as reasonable tomorrow.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
37. See id. at 742.
38. The Court adopted an ad hoc standard of review, scrutinizing the law to
determine whether it "addresses an extremely important problem, without im-
posing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech." Id. at 743.
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At a practical level, courts are already confronting difficult
questions regarding the reach of their authority. With the ever in-
creasing globalization of communications and commerce, courts will
be increasingly faced with cases of international dimensions-or
cases without any clear geographical dimensions at all. The Sympo-
sium mock trial briefs that follow explore some of the difficult juris-
dictional issues engendered by the Internet.
Of course, quite apart from the question of the dejure limits of a
court's jurisdiction is the question of the defacto limits of a court's
power. For example, in the DVD DeCSS case, the court issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the posting of the DeCSS code
anywhere on the Internet, even as it recognized the likelihood that its
order would be disobeyed.39 In fact, the DeCSS code has recently
been embedded within a Domain Names System (DNS) record and
continues to spread across the Internet, despite the court's injunc-
40tion.
The transnational nature of the Internet, coupled with its atten-
dant anonymity, poses serious challenges to law enforcement agen-
cies, as well. A Clinton administration report has recently called for
new and expanded law enforcement tools to address "the need for
real-time tracing of Internet communications across traditional juris-
dictional boundaries, both domestically and internationally, [and] the
need to track down sophisticated users who commit unlawful acts on
the Internet while hiding their identities.",4 1  As law enforcement
39. "In granting this injunction this Court is mindful of the many enforce-
ment problems. However, a possibility or even a likelihood that an order may
be disobeyed or not enforced in other jurisdictions is not a reason to deny the
relief sought" DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804
(Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County Jan. 20, 2000) (order granting preliminary
injunction), available at <http://www.eff.org/ip/Video/DVDCCAcase/
20000120-pi-order.htil>.
40. At the time of this writing, the code was embedded in the DNS record
goret.org, located at IP address 138.195.138.195. DNS records comprise part
of the Internet's operational fabric and are most often used to convert a com-
puter's Internet name (e.g., www.lls.edu) into its Internet address (e.g.
206.17.96.220). By using a DNS record as a transport, as opposed to merely
posting the code on a Web site, the code can be widely distributed and is much
harder for law enforcement to locate.
41. The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving
the Use of the Internet, A Report of the President's Working Group on Un-
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agencies seek new powers to confront technological challenges, a
new balance must be struck between the institutional needs of these
agencies and the civil liberties of civilians.
These are, of course, just a few of the structural challenges fac-
ing our legal and political institutions as a result of rapidly changing
technology. Whether these institutions can adequately respond to
such challenges will have tremendous implications for the continuing
democratic and economic vitality of our society.
II. CHALLENGES FACING LEGAL EDUCATON
If our political and legal institutions are to meet these chal-
lenges, our educational institutions must develop new ways to pre-
pare individuals for leadership roles in a society marked by rapidly
changing technology. At the same time, technological change pres-
ents significant challenges to our educational institutions themselves.
Law schools are purveyors of information to a profession that it-
self deals with information. How can advances in information man-
agement and distribution threaten this centuries-old institution? The
answer is that lawyers and law professors are, to a large extent, in-
formation intermediaries. That is, they provide and process infor-
mation. As data flows more readily from the information generator
to the information consumer, professional intermediation serves dif-
ferent needs.
Law schools have begun to respond in three ways: (1) by de-
veloping new courses responsive to the peculiar legal issues of new
technologies; (2) integrating technology into the pedagogy (teaching
methods); and (3) offering distance education (virtual classrooms).
Law schools that understand and implement these three areas of
change will succeed in the information age. Those that do not will
become obsolete.
Adding technology law to the curriculum is not as easy as it may
look. Not only are the doctrinal rules in flux, but faculty and stu-
dents must embrace the underlying technology addressed by the de-
veloping law. That means a course in cyberlaw should include in-
struction on network architecture, packet switching, and encryption.
lawful Conduct on the Internet, Section V: Conclusions and Recommendations
(March 9, 2000), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
unlawful.htm>.
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A course in telecommunications law should include background on
radio wave propagation and spectrum management. A course in
biotech law should cover molecular structures. And so on.
In the old days (about ten years ago), technology courses were
limited to those sub-disciplines such as patent law where science or
engineering backgrounds were a prerequisite for entering the profes-
sion. Today, technology-based legal issues are not limited to the in-
tellectual property firms. General practitioners are doing Internet
law because their general business clients are. It should not be sur-
prising, therefore, that the University of Chicago has added a new
course to the first-year law curriculum, "Technology, Innovation and
Society."
More than 150 cyberlaw and technology courses are now being
taught at American law schools, ranging from survey courses to
highly specialized "techlaw" courses.42 The course names-such as
Harvard Law School's "Evidence, Truth, and the Intemet"-bespeak
the scope of change underway. Cyberlaw is emerging as a doctrinal
area of its own, on par with contracts and torts.43
Not only is the substance of law courses changing, but also the
manner of instruction. Technology is making its way into the legal
classroom in a big way. The laptop computer has replaced the pen
and notebook. The chalkboard is giving way to the projected image.
The linear outline is yielding to the multi-dimensional graphic and
Power Point slide show. Lecterns and student desks are being con-
nected to the Internet. Class and office hours are becoming "24/7"
with chatrooms and messaging systems. With all these advances and
entry points to knowledge, how can the Socratic method survive?
The third and most significant challenge to law schools is dis-
tance education. Distance learning over the Internet provides both
opportunity and a threat to law schools. As on-line law schools pro-
liferate,44 physical location and "residency" lose significance. The
42. See Cyberlaw and Technology Courses at U.S. Law Schools (visited
Mar. 15, 2000) <http://faculty.Ils.edu/manheim/cyberlawsurvey.htm> (listing
courses as diverse as "Mergers and Acquisitions in High Tech" and "Exclusive
Rights in the Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industries," both of which are
taught at the University of California at Berkeley).
43. See Jurist - The Legal Education Network (visited Mar. 15, 2000)
<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/couipgs.htm#Cyberspace>.
44. There are now two such schools in the United States, Concord Law
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cost of education alone may lead some to prefer on-line instruction.
Leading schools can extend their hegemony by offering courses to
non-matriculating students.4a Harvard,46 as well as its professors,47
already have.
Currently, the American Bar Association is taking a very cau-
tious approach to distance learning in legal education. Ostensibly,
this is because of perceived inadequacies in instruction. 4' But it may
also be to protect an entrenched membership. Still, experimental
programs are being encouraged, and the rules are bound to change.49
This despite questioning from high places about the efficacy of on-
line education.50
School, see <http://www.concordlawschool.com>, and Regent University
School of Law, see <http://www.regentedu/acad/schlaw>. Two law schools in
Great Britain are also on-line, University of Strathclyde (offering LL.M. in IT
Law), see <http://law-www-server.law.strath.ac.uk>, and Semple Piggot
Rochez (the world's first Internet law program, offering the University of Lon-
don External LL.B.), see <http://www.spn-law.com>.
45. See Donald J. Weidner, The Crises of Legal Education: A Wake Up
Callfor Faculty, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 92, 98, 100 (1997) (new technologies will
soon allow teaching faculty from prestigious law schools to instruct students at
a much lower cost than visiting or new faculty professors).
46. The Berknan Center's Online Education Program is offering several
courses, including Intellectual Property in Cyberspace, Trust and Non-Trust in
Law, and Violence Against Women. See The Berkman Center for Internet
& Society at Harvard Law School (visited Apr. 18, 2000)
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/online>.
47. Harvard Professor Arthur Miller is now offering classes on LawTV.
See <http://www.lawschool.com/lawtv>.
48. See generally Andrea L. Johnson, Distance Learning and Technology in
Legal Education: A 21st Century Experiment, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 213
(1997); Helen Leskovac, Distance Learning in Legal Education: Implications
ofFrame Relay Videoconferencing, 8 ALE. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 305 (1998).
49. The ABA Legal Education Section published Temporary Distance Edu-
cation Guidelines in 1997 to encourage experimentation with distance learning
technologies. See James P. White, Memorandum D9697-59 (visited Mar. 15,
2000) <http://www.abanet org/legaled/distance.html>.
50. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg set off a firestorm recently
when she questioned the efficacy of Internet-based law schools. See Katherine
S. Mangan, Justice Ginsburg Questions Internet-Only Law School, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Sept 24, 1999, at A36 ("I am uneasy about classes in which
students learn entirely from home, in front of a computer screen, with no face-
to-face interaction with other students and instructors."). For the text of Justice
Ginsburg's remarks, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for Dedication of Rut-
gers Center for Law and Justice (Sept 9, 1999) <http://rutgers-
newark.rutgers.edu/occ/speech.htm>.
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IV. BRIDGING THE GAP: THE LAW AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
The Law and Technology Program was inspired and sponsored
by Dr. Henry Yuen, President of Gemstar International Group, Ltd.,
as a model for a new type of instruction designed to better prepare
both law and technology students to face the legal and social impli-
cations of technological change. The aim of the program was two-
fold. First, the program sought to preview how a possible interdisci-
plinary course in law and technology might be structured. This po-
tential course would bring together science-engineering students and
law students to train them to resolve novel legal issues arising from
advanced technology. Second, the program aimed to create a forum
for dialogue between the legal and technical communities to heighten
awareness about these novel legal issues.
The Law and Technology Program's first event was a mock trial
designed to promote dialogue between the technologists and law-
yers-and to explore where the dialogue breaks down. The key for
both the technical and legal participants was to better understand
where, and to What extent, the "translation" between them no longer
worked. It was obvious that the esoteric issues would not be under-
stood by those unskilled in the discipline. However, the "translation"
goes beyond the mere technical understanding of law or science-it
addresses how the two disciplines communicate and how they will
work together to resolve a common problem.
Beyond the language barrier, each discipline also has its own
unique culture, and even more important, its own methodology for
solving problems. Understanding these cultural and methodological
issues is a fundamental part of building productive interdisciplinary
relationships.
At the mock trial the parties argued three narrow issues. First,
could a federal court in California exercise personal jurisdiction over
defendants whose only "presence" in California was "virtual"? Sec-
ond, was venue proper considering the defendant's organizational
structure and purpose? And third, was service of process adequately
made by posting notice of the lawsuit to an Internet user's group and
Internet newsletter? Limiting the mock trial to these issues allowed a
more complete analysis and presentation of the novel legal issues
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presented. 51 Additionally, by limiting the legal issues, and stipulating
all the pertinent facts, audience members were able to grasp the na-
ture of the problem from the outset.
The novel legal issues, however, did require the participants to
fully research traditional rules and case law in order to develop a
suitable rationale for the rule of law they proposed the court adopt.
The issue of whether or not personal jurisdiction was proper was
aided somewhat by controlling case law addressing jurisdiction in
cyberspace. 52 However, the issue of whether or not service of proc-
ess was proper was an issue of first impression for the court. Of
course, these legal questions are factually dependent issues requiring
a thorough understanding of the underlying technology. It became
critical for each party to work together as a team, helping each other
understand the significance of facts and how they supported their po-
sition.
Each party's lead attorney performed the opening and closing
arguments. However, the Caltech students, making what was most
likely their legal debut, performed the direct examination of their
party's expert witness. The Loyola Law School students performed
the cross-examination of the opposing party's expert witness. Both
the Caltech students and the Loyola Law School students prepared
extensive briefing materials on the various issues raised by the par-
ties in their briefs, and briefing materials to aid the judge with his
opinion.
The program was a unique experience for the participants and,
by all accounts, an overwhelming success. Hopefully, further col-
laborative projects between law and technology students will follow.
The works that follow have been compiled and edited from the
mock trial. These materials include: the facts of the case, the Brief
in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, the Brief in Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss, the Summary of Expert Testimony in Support of
51. Although novel, the issues raised in the mock trial are still real. For in-
stance, because of the anonymity of the Internet, cases are being filed against
unknown defendants. See, e.g., FTC v. One or More Unknown
Parties (W.D.N.C. 1999), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9905/
7674451775.htm>.
52. The Closed team successfully analogized the mock trial facts to Panavi-
sion International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the Motion, the Summary of Expert Testimony in Opposition to the
Motion, the Judge's Opinion, and the Keynote Address.
In closing, we wish to thank the project's participants for their
exceptionally hard work and dedication. The success of this event is
in no small part owed to them. We also wish to thank the following
individuals for their efforts: from Caltech, Professor K. Mani
Chandy, Lawrence Gilbert, Nick Nichols, and Professor Tom Tom-
brello. From Loyola Law School, Dean Gerald McLaughlin, Ken-
neth Ott, and Elizabeth Fry. Additionally, we would like to thank
Wes Monroe and Christie, Parker & Hale, LLP, for their support.
Lastly, we would like to thank Dr. Henry Yuen, President of Gemstar
International Group, Ltd. Dr. Yuen provided both the spark and the
catalyst-ensuring the event's success.
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PROJECT PARTICIPANTS
Trial Judge
Diarmuid O'Scannlain - United States Circuit Judge for the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
"Open Sesame" Attorney
Donald I. Baker - Baker & Miller, LLP
"Closed Corporation "Attorney
Terrence McMahon - Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP
Expert Witnesses
Edward W. Felten - Department of Computer Science, Prince-
ton University
Linus Torvalds - Transmeta Corporation
Keynote Speaker
Ira Magaziner - S.J.S. Advisors
Program Coordinator
David J. Steele - Loyola Law School and Christie, Parker &
Hale, LLP
Program Sponsor and Advisor
Henry Yuen - President & CEO, Gemstar International. Dr.
Yuen received a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the Califor-
nia Institute of Technology in 1973, and his J.D. from Loyola
Law School in 1979.
Participating Students
California Institute of Technology
Roman Ginis
Joseph Kiniry
Daniel Zimmerman
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Loyola Law School
Alan Heinrich
Vincent Pollmeier
Lena Smith
Professor Karl Manheim - Loyola Law School faculty
advisor
